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Both at the local and the global level, the environmentaldegradation resulting from China’s economic growththus seems inevitable for the next few decades. On the
other hand, the question concerning the forms of and the
timeframe for the reactions that this degradation will provoke
remains open. Atmospheric pollution in the cities and its
cortege of premature deaths from pulmonary disease, the
degradation and the warming of water in industrial regions,
the premises of climate change (the winter of 2006-2007 has
been the warmest for 167 years in Beijing) are no longer ig-
nored((2). Legislative initiatives have sometimes been taken by
the central authorities directed against certain provincial and
local leaders. Chinese industries, both in the electricity and
coal-producing sectors, are progressively adopting technologies
that are as efficient as those being used in the United States
and Europe. In some cases, they are even demonstrating more
boldness. How far will they go on this path? Will the benefi-
cial environmental effects that can be anticipated succeed in
offsetting the inevitable degradation already forecast? When
could it be possible for the rising trajectories of greenhouse
gas emissions (GGS) to be reversed?Coal  in  China’s  energy land-scape
Irresistible growth in  energy and e lectricity
From 1980 to 2005, China accomplished the feat of ensur-
ing that its GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10%
while limiting to 5% the growth rate in its consumption of
primary energy sources. One part of the discrepancy has not
been voluntary, as is attested to by the energy shortfalls that
recur in the cities and even more so in the rural areas con-
demned to rely on supplies that have been made precarious
by the increasing scarcity of biomass (crop waste and fire-
wood). The other, most important part has resulted from a
sharp increase in the efficiency of coal use through the mod-
ernisation of thermal power stations and high energy con-
suming industries: coking, steel-making, cement production,
chemicals, non-ferrous metals. Result: the energy intensity of
GDP decreased by more than 60% up to 2001, before sta-
bilising and then setting off on an upward trend again((3). Is
the evolution over the last four years nothing more than a
stage, as in 1988-89, on the path of a long decline in energy
intensity, or does it signify a reversal of the trend? Adhering
to the first premise of this question, the Eleventh Five-Year
Plan (2006-2010) has set as a target a new reduction of
A dust cloud over the Pacific visible from orbiting satellites, an alarming growth in mercury content throughout the
biosphere in North America, global CO2 emissions greater than those of the United States from 2009: the formidable
growth of China’s thermoelectric generating capacity, based on coal production that crossed the threshold of two bil-
lion tons (2Gt) in 2005, is becoming one of the major industrial evolutions threatening the global environment. What
is more, while the developed world’s ecological impact should, in the future, be moderated by the slowdown in energy
growth and far-reaching technological changes, China’s impact is only now beginning to make itself felt. Its current
consumption per capita of 1.25 tons equivalent petroleum (TEP) and of 1,607 kWh is still closer to the average of de-
veloping countries than to that of the developed world (4.73 and 8,204). Who, and in the name of what principle,
could demand of China that it willingly renounces modernisation, which cannot be achieved without an increased
supply of electricity, fuelled by coal, the only abundant and cheap energy source at its disposal?((1)
1. To measure the distance already covered and the road still to be travelled, it should be
remembered that the number of inhabitants without access to electricity has dropped
from 245 million in 1979 to 20 million in 2004. Thomas C. Heller, “Diversifier la produc-
tion électrique en Chine,” in Pierre Jacquet, Laurence Tubiana (eds.), Regards sur la
terre. Dossier Energie et changement climatique, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2006,
pp. 119-130. 
2. Geoffrey York, “Will China be able to take the heat?”, Globe and Mail, 7 February 2007.
3. Among the numerous works that have tackled the question, reference can be made to:
Jeffrey Logan, “Diverging Energy and Economic Growth in China: Where Has All The Coal
Gone?”, Pacific and Asian Journal of Energy, vol. 11 nº 1, pp. 1-13, and more recently
to: Ma Chunbo and David I. Stern, “China’s Changing Energy Intensity Trend: A
Decomposition Analysis”, Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics, nº 0615, December
2006.
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20% in intensity in five years. Even if it were achieved, this
goal would not, however, be enough to maintain at under 4%
the annual growth rate in primary energy consumption,
which, already standing at 1,700 million TEP (Mtep) in
2005, could exceed 3,200 Mtep by 2020((4). Several devel-
opments support this prospect: the target of the government
to quadruple GDP between 2000 and 2020, that is an an-
nual growth rate of 7% over the period, a growth rate that
has already been exceeded in the course of the last six years;
the pursuit of a strong growth of industries that are high en-
ergy consuming, foremost among which is steel-making((5);
the energy impact of rapid urbanisation((6); the necessary
spread of commercial energy sources to Chinese rural areas
confronted by the serious threat of complete deforestation((7).
This energy flux will primarily be absorbed in two forms;
fuels intended for road, air, water and maritime transport;
and electricity demanded by industry and domestic house-
holds for the purposes of lighting, motive power and heating.
China, like the rest of the world, can only modernise and ur-
banise on the basis of electricity growth that is more rapid
than that of its total energy consumption. In industry, as in
the residential and tertiary sector, coal is being replaced by
electricity((8). Over the last ten years, China has paid for the
inadequate anticipation of this evolution through frequent
black-outs. Since then, it has shifted into high gear, installing
annual power capacity of a scope never before encountered
4. Zhao Jianping, “China: Powering the Growth”, CEPII seminar “L’énergie et la Chine”, 27
April 2006. This evaluation, judged the most likely at the beginning of 2007, renders null
and void all the scenarios from 2004. Cf. Noureddine Berrah, “La Chine réveillée”, Revue
de l’Energie, nº 563, January-February 2005, pp. 9-13. It also prompts a re-examination
of the hypothesis according to which China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) might moderate the growth in energy consumption via a reduction of the produc-
tion structure and the elimination of energy subsidies. Cf. Andreas Oberheitmann, “Le
secteur de l’énergie et la protection de l’environnement en Chine,” Perspectives chi-
noises, nº 69, January-February 2002, pp. 39-52.
5. Steel production capacity is to be increased from 270 to 400 Mt between 2005 and
2020.
6. Under the effects of the rural exodus, the urban population is growing by 4% a year.
Aside from the megalopolises of Beijing and Shanghai, 72 cities in China already have
populations greater than one million inhabitants. An inhabitant of Hong Kong still only
consumes 20 megajoules (MJ) a day set against 70 MJ in the big cities of the devel-
oped world.
7. And this dates from a long time ago, as is analysed very well by Vaclav Smil, Energy in
China’s modernisation. Advances and limitations, New York, East Gate Books, 1988, p.
44-84. This is confirmed by the shorter but more recent article by Frédéric Obringer,
“Environnement”, in T. Sanjuan (ed.), Dictionnaire de la Chine contemporaine. Paris, A.
Colin, 2006, p. 95-97.
8. Between 1996 and 2001, the coal consumption by industry decreased by 36.4%, while
electricity consumption grew 46%. In the big cities, the majority of small boilers and coal
stoves have been replaced by non-polluting electric installations. Cf. Yang Hongliang,
Overview of the Chinese Electricity Industry and its Current Uses, CWPE 0617 and EPRG
0517, February 2006, p. 34.
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Peasants collecting coal in Shanxi province
in the history of the electricity industry: 50GW in 2004, 70
in 2005, 102 in 2006 and possibly 90 in 2007((9). At a
stroke, the projection of 950GW in 2020, drawn up in 2004
by the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), is already null and void. The Chinese electricity
industry is now aiming at power capacity in the magnitude
of 1,200 to 1,300GW, persuaded that it will have to satisfy
an electricity demand that will be greater than 5,000 TWh
in 2020. In the longer term, production of 12,000 TWh in
2050 seems considerable, but it would only supply 6,480
kWh for each inhabitant, that is 20% less than the current
average consumption in developed countries.
Coal,  a  fuel  without  serious  competitors 
How can this amount of electricity be produced? Excluding
autogeneration of electricity by industry using small diesel
engines, which are going to disappear, the generation capac-
ity that supplied the public networks in 2006 was made up
of hydroelectric power stations (24%) and some other re-
newable sources (0.7%), nuclear power stations (2%), gas-
fired thermal power stations (2.3%) and coal-fired thermal
power stations (71%). The share of this last sector was vol-
untarily reduced to 66% in 2000 in the name of a diversifi-
cation of electricity production that benefited the protection
of the environment. Very quickly, however, the development
of the other sectors encountered several obstacles. Hydro-
electric power has progressed and will continue on this path,
as its economic potential is still considerable, but the instal-
lations, especially when they are gigantic, require long lead
times (officially launched in 1994, the Three Gorges project
will not supply all of its planned 18GW until 2009), as well
as certain environmental safety measures (Wen Jiabao,
prime minister, is said to have intervened personally to sus-
pend another very big project on the Nu river)((10). Since the
first two reactors at Daya Bay, the Chinese nuclear industry
has constructed nuclear production capacity of 6.2GW in
twenty years. It has proceeded at this voluntarily prudent
rate out of a concern to master the whole field (construction
of reactors and fuel cycle) before embarking on the target of
40GW by 2020, which will represent, at best, 3% to 4% of
the installed power capacity. Neither the efforts already un-
dertaken to give advantage to the small hydroelectric power
stations (capacity less than 10 MW), wind power and bio-
gas in the remote rural regions, nor the law of 28 February
2005 that set at 20% the share of renewables in the supply
by 2050, should change the marginal character of these en-
ergy sources in the overall electricity production in the next
few decades((11). This is even more true as the distance be-
tween the locations in the west where the largest part of
their potential is situated and the large centres of consump-
tion on the southeast coast reduces still further a competi-
tiveness that is already undermined by the intermittency and
the dispersal of these energy sources.
Within the framework of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-
2005), gas-fired thermal powers stations appeared to pro-
vide a solution capable of rapidly and cleanly satisfying the
demand of the large agglomerations on the southeast coast,
but it had to face disappointment. The national production
of 50 Gm3 in 2005, of which 12 Gm3 is transported via the
“West-East” gas pipeline put into service in October 2004
and, with 5 Gm3 of Australian gas gasified at the terminal in
Guangdong since 2006, is intended as a priority for indus-
try (the chemical industry in particular) and for urban resi-
dential usage. Unless the growth in national production is
more rapid than foreseen, the 60GW generated by gas-fired
thermal power stations planned for 2020, of which 18GW
will come from liquid natural gas (LNG), will therefore not
see the light of day, as the evolution of international gas
prices will by then have moved too far away from the 2.2
$/MBtu (British thermal unit) of the first contract with Aus-
tralia (the Guangdong terminal) and even from the 3.8$
/MBtu of the contract with Indonesia (the Fujian terminal,
operational in 2009)((12). Coal thus has every chance of re-
maining China’s principal source of electricity for a long
time, based on installed capacity that will represent 64% of
total generation in 2020 and 48% in 2050 (see table 1).
The competitiveness of the sector is related to the capacity
of Chinese electromechanical construction to supply thermo-
electrical kW at unbeatable prices ($530 per kW with wet
desulphurisation in 2005), while it does not have experience
in building gas turbines, as well as to the very favourable con-
9. David Kelly, “China’s power capacity soars”, Financial Times, 6 February 2007. The
installed capacity in 2006 is far greater than what had been announced. A revision may
be necessary in the light of definitive data.
10. Thomas Land, “China puts its faith in nuclear power”, Energy Economist, no. 273, July
2004, p. 15-19.
11. 20% in 2050 is not unrealistic if large-scale hydroelectric power is included, which the
documents in our possession do not specify. Responsibility for the other sources is sup-
posed to be assumed by the China Energy Conservation Investment Corporation (CECIC),
which is proposing to invest 2.47 billion dollars over five years in wind power, biomass
and biogas, profiting from the obligation made to the electricity companies in this sec-
tor to purchase “green electricity” at a price greater than that of the other branches. Cf.
Enerpresse, 29 December 2005. 
12. Important gas discoveries were made in 2006 in the Tarim basin, in the Bohai Gulf, the
Songliao basin and the Ordos basin, but the time it will take to start exploitation does
not seem compatible with strong growth in gas-fired thermal power stations before
2020. Catherine Locatelli, Jean-Pierre Angelier, Quel développement pour le gaz en
Chine?, LEPII, Grenoble, pre-print, January 2007.
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ditions for the supply of the power stations with solid fuel.
Present underground in almost all of China’s regions, of ex-
cellent quality in those of the north (Shanxi, Shaanxi, Mon-
golia and Ningxia in particular), exploitable at average
depths of 300-500 metres, most often in rich, shallowly
sloped veins, coal is and will remain abundant. With re-
serves evaluated at 96Gt (12.2% of the world’s reserves),
China is ranked just behind the United States and Russia.
Its resources, estimated at 888Gt, or 22% of global re-
sources, make it the second coal power behind Russia((13).
The best deposits can be exploited at costs less than
$20/ton, which ensures a low price for the electricity at the
modern power stations built at the pit heads. The length of
transportation (800km on average), and the mediocre qual-
ity of some of them, makes the fuel delivered to the south-
east coast dearer, but at a price of $60/ton, it is still without
rival for the generation at the thermoelectric power stations.
Outside its use as a means of industrial and domestic heat-
ing which will not totally disappear, the growth in demand
for it in steel-making and in the electricity industry sets its
production on a trajectory that will see it double, as a mini-
mum, from here to 2050, perhaps even more if the great ad-
venture of synthetic fuel succeeds.
China,  taking  the  l ead in  coal -to -l iquids(CTL) proj ects
Everything had started well for the Chinese oil industry.
The prospecting campaigns conducted with the assistance of
the Soviet Union at the time of the First Five-Year Plan
(1953-1957) resulted in the discovery of several deposits, in-
cluding those at Daqing in 1959 and Shengli in 1962. Rapid
(too rapid?) exploitation brought production up to more
than 100Mt in 1978, encouraging China to become an ex-
porter and inspiring the dream of becoming a new Saudi
Arabia! The 1980s were marked by a return to reality, soon
followed by a call for imports and by a growing external de-
pendence. Since that period, the experiences of Germany in
the 1930s and South Africa in the embargo years have in-
terested China. The idea of reducing imports of crude petro-
leum by liquefying coal has gained ground. 
Numerous projects have been launched in the course of the
last few years. The most ambitious is that of the Shenhua
Group in the autonomous region of Mongolia: on the basis
of a direct liquefaction process (Bergius type) perfected in
China, it has the ambition of producing 5Mtep by 2010,
then 15Mtep and 30Mtep by 2015 and 2020. Parallel to
that, indirect liquefaction (Fischer-Tropsch type) has not
been forgotten: in partnership with the big South African
company Sasol, the Shenhua Group and its subsidiary
Table 1. China Electricity generation in a business-as-usual scenario
13. While the reserves are of measured quantities and judged to be exploitable at current
prices, the resources are not and result only from the geological knowledge of the
ground. The above data is taken from the Bundesanstalt für Gewissenschaften und
Rohstoffe (BGR), Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Resources 2004, 68 p.
The BGR estimates of the resources seem more reasonable than those of the US
Department of Energy, which has suggested volumes four times as high. The Chinese
studies suggest recoverable resources of 1,000Gt and proven reserves of 114.5Gt,
which could be increased to 284.5Gt by 2020 depending on large-scale investments in
exploration.
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Ningxia Coal Industry is planning the construction of two
plants of 3.6Mtep in the province of Shaanxi and in the au-
tonomous region of Ningxia. Thirty or so other projects have
been announced, including those of the Lu’an Group in
Shanxi (5.2Mtep in 2016), of the Yankuang Group in
Shaanxi (10Mtep in 2020) and the one of Shenhua in part-
nership with Shell. If all of them materialise, China could
produce within 15 years more than 70Mtep, absorbing
around 210Mtep of coal that for reasons of quality has little
recoverable value otherwise on the fuel market((14). More-
over, it would take a certain lead over the industries of other
countries also attracted by synthetic fuels, but less convinced
of the possibilities and thus not ready to commit heavy in-
vestment to them at the moment.
An increas ingly high-performance  coal  in-dust ry
The high coal demand prospects for coal will have more
chance of becoming reality as Chinese industry becomes ca-
pable of fulfilling them. Without excluding an increased re-
course to the importation of certain types of coal required by
the industries on the southeast coast, a strong expansion of
Chinese coal capacities seems highly likely. After having en-
couraged the development of the Local State Mines (LSM)
and Small Local Mines (SLM), which has enabled it to get
around the rigidities and the delays in the expansion of the
Central State Mines (CSM) between 1978 and 1996, the
Chinese government has instigated a far-reaching restructur-
ing of the whole coal industry centred around a dozen very
large companies (from 50 to 100 Mt/year), which have
been called on to become vertically integrated and oriented
on electricity generation and the production of synthetic
fuels. Gradually, these latter are taking over the market
shares of other categories of mines, including the very small
peasant mines that the authorities are attempting to close
with more or less success((15). At the head of this new indus-
try, companies such as Shenhua, Shanxi Coking, Datong
Coal, Yankuang, Yanzhou, Huainan, Pingdinghan, Za-
ozhuang, which are modernising the extraction and the pro-
cessing of coal, are raising productivity and the safety of the
miners’ work, installing large-scale thermal power stations at
the pit heads and constructing railways to loosen the bottle-
neck affecting the coal’s outlet. Concerned about geograph-
ically diversifying their mining patrimony, some have not
hesitated to open new mines in Mongolia or take shares in
Australian mines((16). According to the latest report by the
National Development and Reform Commission (at the end
of January 2007), production should become established at
2.6Gt in 2010, of which 56% will be supplied by the very
large mines, and perhaps at 3.4Gt in 2030.The government confrontedwith the challenge  of  atmospher ic  po llut ion
Envi ronmental  impact:  taboos that  arebeing knocked down
The combustion of coal by domestic households, industry
and the thermal power stations is not the only source of pol-
luting emissions in a country that continues to burn huge
quantities of biomass in installations of little efficiency and
that is playing the card of a rapid expansion of road trans-
port (see table 2). But, while in the developed world today
these diverse sources of pollution have happened one after
the other, in China they are being combined. Their emis-
Dandong, Liaoning: statue of 











14. This programme could be reduced according to a NDRC authority (9 June 2007). Among
the reasons for this possible reduction, are the high costs of investment, the insufficient
evaluation of water resources and the Shenhua Group lack of experience in direct liq-
uefaction. The indirect liquefaction projects, however, would not be changed.
15. The small mines are responsible for 74% of the 2.73 miners killed per million tons
extracted, compared with 0.24 in India and 0.04 in the United States in 2005. Tu Jianjun,
“Safety challenges in China’s coal mining industry”, China Brief, The Jamestown
Foundation, vol. 7, nº 1.
16. Jean-Marie Martin-Amouroux, “Le charbon-roi, jusqu’à quand?”, Revue de l’Energie, nº
563, January-February 2005, pp. 14-18; “Charbon: les métamorphoses d’une indus-
trie”, Revue de l’Energie, nº 573, September-October 2006, pp. 305-313; article
“Charbon” in T. Sanjuan (ed.), Dictionnaire, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
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sions are known and have been published since 1980 (see
table 3). The volumes of sulphur dioxide (SO2) seemed to
increase by 50% and those of particulates by 67% between
1980 and 1995, before falling 20% and 60% respectively up
to 2002. At this date, the two polluting emissions, of which
80% to 90% comes from the burning of coal, resumed their
rise, a particularly pronounced rise for SO2
((17). Emissions of
nitrogen oxide (NOx) have never ceased growing, but their
doubling between 2000 and 2004 can be blamed on road
traffic and not electricity production, which now only repre-
sents 35% of the 20Mt discharged into the atmosphere each
year.
At the beginning of the 1990s, particulates ranging from 10
to 100 t/km2 per month fell on the residential districts of the
big Chinese cities, several hundreds and sometimes a million
t/km2 on the industrial zones. The norm for suspended par-
ticulates of 0.15 g/m3 was exceeded ten to twentyfold in
these same places, particularly in winter when all the build-
ings were heated using coal. While the concentrations of sul-
phur dioxide (SO2) topped out at a ceiling of between 20 to
100 µ g/m3 in urban zones in North America, they have fre-
quently reached 500 to 2,000 in the big cities of northern
China((18). The situation does not seem to have improved ap-
preciably since then. In 2005, 40% of Chinese territory was
affected by acid rain that permeates the soil, the water-
courses and the vegetation, especially in the south. Much
underground water has become unfit for consumption. The
elevated content of SO2, NOx, particulates and heavy met-
als in the atmosphere of urban and industrial zones is the
root cause of the abnormally high rates of morbidity and
mortality((19). What is more, these environmental impacts are
spreading outside China, in the direction of Korea, Japan
and even the United States if one believes those who de-
nounce the wrongdoings perpetrated by the mercury emitted
by Chinese coal on the health of the populations of North
America((20).
Pushed to act, the central authorities promulgated in 1987 a
law governing the control of atmospheric pollution, the
rigour of which has been reinforced several times, particu-
larly by the law of 1995 governing the electricity industry.
They also set up the State Environmental Protection Ad-
ministration (SEPA), equivalent to a ministry, in 1998.
SEPA, which has set emission standards and put in place
monitors charged with the job of ensuring their compliance,
is succeeding in getting very polluting installations closed
down and in interrupting projects undertaken without a prior
environmental impact study. In spite of the limits relating to
its administrative partitioning and the weakness of the invest-
ments in environmental protection((21), SEPA has worked ac-
tively in the energy field. It has made obligatory the installa-
tion of desulphurisers in all new thermal power stations
(50GW have been fitted out), forced the closure of the most
polluting small units (<50MW) with 30GW having been
closed in 2005, and the rest to be closed by 2010—, urged
the electricity industry to equip itself with electrostatic dust
Table 2. Pollutants and CO2 emissions by sector in China (2004)
17. The verb “to seem” is used to take into account the change in the statistical base that
was made in 1995 (see note to table 3).
18. Vaclav Smil, Energy in China, op. cit., p. 214-224.
19. Lung cancers, 70 to 80% of which are attributed to atmospheric pollution, have become
the leading cause of mortality in Beijing, according to the State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA).
20. “Invisible Export: A Hidden Cost Of China Growth: Mercury Migration”, The Wall Street
Journal, 17 December 2004.
21. These have grown from 1% of GDP in 2001 to 1.3% in 2005, but not yet reached the
2% recommended by the World Bank. “The health of a nation”, Business China, 26
February 2007.
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collectors (the State Power Corporation installed 318 of
them in the course of the Ninth Five-Year Plan) and, more
recently, selective catalytic reducers for reducing nitrogen
oxide((22). Furthermore, from July 2003, a tax of 0.6 yuan
per equivalent standard pollutant has been imposed on emis-
sions of SO2, dust, mercury, carbon monoxide and soot. The
influence of the tax on the costs of kWh is so feeble, how-
ever, that it only has little stimulating effect, but the author-
ities are committed to progressively raising the amount((23).
Recently, these measures have not yet borne all their fruit.
The authorities are anticipating a reduction in polluting
emissions of 10% in the course of the Eleventh Five-Year
Plan, then of 30% to 60% of their 2000 levels by 2020.
Their task will not be easy if one trusts the projections for
the emission of SO2 and NOx that were published by the
Energy Research Institute in China (ERI) at the end of
2003((24).
The prevention of  cl imate  change  not  yet  apr ior ity
Does the desire to reduce polluting emissions extend to
emissions of CO2, 80% of which can be attributed to the
burning of coal? From 1980 to 2003, these emissions rose
from 1.4 to 3.7Gt, that is an annual growth rate of 4.3%, far
greater than that of 1.5% for the whole world((25). But the
evolution from 2004 to 2006 is even more worrying, as the
interruption to the lowering of the energy intensity is being
translated by a rise in China’s GDP carbon intensity, some-
thing which could advance by a dozen years the date when
China tops the table of the largest worldwide emitters of
CO2, with 7Gt in 2020 and then 9Gt in 2030. This
prospect does not seem capable of inflecting the policy of
the Chinese government. Since it ratified the Kyoto proto-
col, it has adhered to the principles of “common but differ-
entiated responsibilities” and of “to each according to its
means”. In its eyes, the risks of global warming must be com-
bated first of all by the developed countries, who have the
historical responsibility for it, then by the other countries
who will subordinate their efforts to the requirements of
their own development((26). The Eleventh Five-Year Plan
Table 3. Evolution of pollutants and CO2 emissions in China
22. At the end of 2006, 15 units were installed in the power stations of Houshi, Songyu,
Taicang, Henyun and Ninghai.
23. Asia Pacific Energy Research Center, Energy in China: Transportation, Electric Power and
Fuel Markets, 2004, pp. 68-69.
24. They are recapitulated by Noureddine Berrah, La Chine, op. cit., p. 12.
25. International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, Paris, OCDE, 2005.
26. Xu Huaqing (project leader), China National Energy Strategy and Policy 2020. Subtitle 7:
Global Climate Change: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategy Faced by China,
National Development and Reform Commission. Document not referenced, 45 pp.
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(2006-2010) therefore does not mention the question of car-
bon emissions. On the day following the publication of the lat-
est report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), at the end of January 2007, Mrs Jiang Yu,
spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed
the official position of her government, while recalling that,
since 2005, China has been drawing up a climate plan, the
contents of which could be revealed in spring 2008((27). While
waiting, the government is approving a growing number of in-
vestment projects that are financed by carbon credits and thus
come under the Kyoto protocol. It would also be interested, it
is believed, in an emissions rights trading market in which Chi-
nese sellers and foreign buyers would meet((28). Furthermore,
any progress in the direction of clean coal technologies will
contribute to putting a brake on the growth in CO2 emissions.Clean technologies:  a raceagainst  t ime
Cleaner,  more  e ff ic ient  convers ion  of  coal
The very mediocre average output of China’s thermoelectric
power stations is not an expression of indifference on the
part of the companies to the environmental impact of their
installations. Since the 1960s, Chinese engineers have per-
fected their own models of small circulating fluidised beds (a
process for combusting coal), capable of burning mediocre
quality fuels and of destroying at source a number of pollu-
tants, thanks to a more complete combustion of the coal and
despite a relatively low temperature in the furnace. Around
2,000 units of this type have already been installed, while
300 were still under construction in 2004((29). Of a very mod-
est size (<100MW), the fluidised beds, however, only rep-
resent a small fraction of China’s electricity generation sys-
tem, the majority of which is made up of pulverised coal
power stations, the efficiency of which is no greater than
30%. The age and the small size of a large number of these
units (in 2000, 67% of thermoelectric capacity came from
units smaller than 200MW) are the primary cause of this
27. Published in 4 June 2007, this plan lays out China’s policy principles on climate change.
It fixes no quantitative goals but states that China will participate in international efforts
against climate change by engaging in energy efficiency, reforestation and by adapting
agriculture to scarce water resources.
28. Shai Oster, “China Tilts Green”, Shai.oster@dowjones.com.
29. Jean-Marie Martin-Amouroux, “L’incontournable charbon”, in Pierre Jacquet and
Laurence Tubiana, Regards, op. cit., pp. 85-96. 
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Baotou, Inner Mongolia: employees of industrial plants
on their way back home
poor efficiency. It is therefore by renewing its thermal power
generation with more modern power stations that China’s
electricity industry will make the most significant contribu-
tion to the reduction of pollution and GGS. And this is
something it has been doing since it adopted large size
(600MW) supercritical cycles which allow efficiency of
45% and which are all fitted with equipment to eliminate
dust and most of the SO2. In 2005, 132 such units were or-
dered, and when they come on stream they will contribute
to a net improvement in air quality((30), especially if the coal
industry supplies them with a higher proportion of washed
coal.
In  the  longer  term: coa l  gasi fication,  com-bined cyc le  turb ines and  capture  and  sto r-age  o f  CO2
The supercritical cycles could constitute only one step to-
wards coal burning that is cleaner and that at the same time
emits less CO2. China is therefore working on several paths,
most often in partnership with large foreign construction
groups such as Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Mitsui Babcock, Alstom
or Siemens: ultra-supercritical cycles, recommended by the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),
which could achieve efficiency of 50% by 2020((31); large cir-
culating fluidised beds the experience that has been accu-
mulated on them is considerable((32); gasification integrated
with a combined cycle (Integrated Gasification Combine
Cycles—IGCC)—a demonstration unit is planned at Yantai
(Shandong)—while the Thermal Power Research Institute
(TPRI) is studying another project of 120MW and the
China Huaneng Group (CHNG) embarked in 2005 on the
ambitious implementation of GreenGen, which in 2020 is
supposed to produce electricity and hydrogen with no pollu-
tant or CO2 emissions; polygeneration, which consists in
producing, on the basis of a synthesis gas (syngas) that re-
sults from mixing several fuels, a large range of products:
electricity, hydrogen, fuels, chemical products((33) (very ad-
vanced in the field of coal gasification, Shell has granted sev-
eral groups, such as Sinopec, Shenhua and Dahua, the right
to exploit its patents((34)); the capture and storage of CO2,
with several research and development programmes all set to
be launched, one of which enjoys the support of the Euro-
pean Union, which is prepared to take on the additional cost
of a demonstration operation in a timeframe up to 2015; the
extraction of coal-bed methane, which has taken off since
the creation in 1996 of China United Coal Bed Methane
(CUCBM), the first implementation of which on the
Huabei site (Anhui) could produce 500 Mm3/year of
methane (CMM)((35); on-site gasification and transportation
by gas pipeline.
If one day it manages to progress from supercritical cycles to
IGCCs, China would significantly reduce the polluting
emissions of its electricity power stations (see table 4). This
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
30. It would be possible to go even further in this direction through a programme involving
the retrofitting of old power stations with supercritical boilers, which, averaging an addi-
tional cost of 10%, would reduce polluting and CO2 emissions by 20%. Cf. Eloise Logan,
“New coal-burn technology helps China present a cleaner face to the world”, Energy
Economist, nº 283, May 2005, pp. 9-12.
31. Mitsui-Babcock, which joined forces with Harbin Boiler Co (HBC) to push through the
take-up of this technology in China, states a figure of 75%. Eloise Logan, “New coal-
burn technology”, loc. cit., p. 11. This information is either incorrect or spin.
32. Six constructors are building installations of more than 100MW: Harbin Boiler Works (49
sold), Dongfang BW (50), Shanghai BW (12), Wuxi BW (12), Jinan BW and Wuhan BW.
These last three constructors are working in particular with the IET, which has just
brought on stream a 150MW unit in Inner Mongolia, while TPRI has developed a 200MW
unit with Harbin Boiler Works and is working on the design of a 300MW unit. In co-oper-
ation with Alstom, twenty or so blocks of 300MW should soon have been constructed.
Let us add that China has sold CFBs to Vietnam and to Turkey and that offers have been
made in India.
33. Yamashita Kei and Leonardo Barreto, “Energyplexes for the 21st Century: Coal
Gasification for Co-producing Hydrogen, Electricity and Liquid Fuels”, Energy, nº 30,
2005, pp. 2453-2473.
34. Martin Clark, “No longer a dirty word”, Petroleum Economist, October 2004, pp. 30-31.
35. By 2015, the production of methane extracted from Chinese coal mines could reach 20
Gm3/year, that is 20% of production or 12.5% of the national consumption of natural
gas.
Table 4. Pollutants emissions from three
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technology furthermore presents numerous other advan-
tages: it demands far less cooling water (350-450 gal-
lons/MWh in place of 600-700), which is significant for
China’s northern regions; it lends itself well to the capture
and storage of CO2, something which is indispensable from
the perspective of the fight against climate change.Changes  in  t ra jectory?  No doubt,  but  when?
Barring unforeseeable events (war, serious economic crisis
or “miraculous” discovery of giant hydrocarbon deposits),
China has no reason to abandon its prospects of strong
growth in electricity production primarily based on the burn-
ing of coal, which ensures that it enjoys both the lowest costs
and security of supply, something to which its leaders are
particularly attached. The more widespread application of
dust collectors and gas desulphurisers, the replacement of
old boilers with higher output supercritical cycles and the
use of an increased percentage of washed coal should enable
the growth in polluting emissions to be staunched. On the
other hand, any change in the trajectory of CO2 emissions
seems to be ruled out for a long time. For that to come any
earlier would require China to renounce its goals of low elec-
tricity prices and security of supply, while resorting massively
to Russian gas and sharply accelerating its nuclear and “re-
newable” programmes. The cost paid for the few years
gained on the calendar for the fight against global warming
would certainly seem too expensive. On the other hand, it
cannot be ruled out that beyond 2020, having mastered the
main technologies that emit less CO2 (nuclear, IGCC and
carbon capture and storage), and sufficiently powerful to ac-
cept a stronger external dependence (on Russian gas, in par-
ticular), China will decide to commit itself to the path of re-
ducing its annual GGS. The raising of living standards at
home and the concern to gain international respectability
abroad should compel it in that direction. •
• Translated by Nick Oates
Chinese Coal and Sustainable Development
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